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EFORE the establishment of the United States Board of Tax
Appeals, a taxpayer did not have an opportunity to have the
amount of his federal income tax determined in court before paying
it nor could he secure an impartial hearing before a tribunal which did
not have the dual function of being both prosecutor and judge. The
taxpayer could have various hearings before representatives of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Such hearing was, of course, before administrative officers of the government, who were representatives of the government in securing the collection of its income and
profits taxes. Although these hearings would be before conscientious
men, many of whom were very capable, it is an extremely difficult, if
not impossible task, to represent one party while trying to pass on
the rights of both. The original examination and audit of the taxpayer's books then as now, is by a Revenue Agent who makes his findings and reports them to the Commissioner's office while at the same
time furnishing the taxpayer a copy. This report would pass upon
questions of fact, including accounting records and apply rules of the
Department to those facts. . In cases characterized by the examining
officers as "fraud cases," a confidential report was made and the taxpayer would not receive a copy of this report, although it would be
used in the Income Tax Unit or the Solicitor's office as part of the
record in the case. Thus when the taxpayer appeared for a hearing
he had to meet not only the issue raised by the Revenue Agent's report,
of which he had a copy, but also so-called facts contained in the confidential report of which he might have no knowledge. Such is still the
procedure.
If the Commissioner's determination was adverse to the taxpayer,
he had no recourse other than to pay the tax, file a claim for refund
and upon a denial thereof sue in a Federal District Court or the United
States Court of Claims to recover the amount paid. Theoretically
B
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this gave the taxpayer relief if the court should eventually determine
that he was entitled to a refund. But practically such relief was of
doubtful value to a taxpayer who was compelled to raise a large amount
of money to meet an income tax assessment which might be entirely
unjust but which he must pay, even at the expense of crippling or
ruining his business.
The fundamental principle upon which the Board of Tax Appeals
is based is that the taxpayer shall have a hearing before an independent
and impartial tribunal before being compelled to pay a deficiency of
tax determined by the Commissioner, and thus completely changes the
basis on which federal tax cases were handled before that time.
The Board of Tax Appeals was created by the Revenue Act of 1924,
adopted on June 2, of that year The Board as created by the President's appointment consisted of sixteen members appointed for a two
year term, although the appointment of more was authorized Under
the 1926 Act the Board now consists of sixteen members appointed for
terms of six, eight, ten and twelve years, and the members will eventually be appointed for twelve year terms. Under the present Act they
are paid a salary of $IO,OOO.OO per year.

The act creating the Board characterized it as an independent agency
in the executive branch of the government. It is, in fact, organized
entirely separately from the Treasury Department, and hence from the
Income Tax Unit or the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. This was
not accomplished, however, without protest by the Treasury Department, which originally proposed a Board within the Treasury Department for the review of tax cases and hence a Board which could not be
free of influence from the Treasury Department. Congress did not
follow this suggestion, and the Treasury Department has no control
over the Board of Tax Appeals other than influence in securing the
appointment of a number of former Bureau employees to the Board.
While opinions vary as to the extent of such influence by the Treasury
Department, the Board's reversal of the Commissioner on numerous
important principles shows that it is not only legally independent of the
Treasury Department but has a mind of its own in deciding tax cases
and will use its own independent judgment.
The Board has the right to determine the qualifications for admission
to practice before it. Neither the Act of 1924 or of 1926 gives the
Board specific authority therefor, but the Board's rules have prescribed
who may appear before it, and the Supreme Court has upheld its right
to do SO. 2 Its rules admit attorneys at law who are admitted to prac' Sec. goo Act of 1924, Rule 2 of Board, H. Ely Goldsmith v. U. S. Board of
Tax Appeals. (U. S. Supreme Court), 70 L. ed. 329.
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tice before the Supreme Court of the United States or the highest court
of any state or territory or the District of Columbia, and also certified
public accountants duly qualified under the law of any state or territory or the District of Columbia. This was doubtless a compromise
provision between limiting the practice to only attorneys at law and
admitting all who were enrolled as treasury agents and entitled to practise before the Income Tax Unit and who are not required to be either
attorneys or certified public accountants. This provision is responsible
for many improperly presented cases before the Board due to lack of
knowledge of the rules of evidence and the manner of presenting cases
in court, and experienced certified public accountants are declining to
practise before the Board. Practitioners generally are recognizing
that there is a place for both an accountant and a lawyer in all tax
cases and that cases are best presented to the Board where the two cooperate.
The Board of Tax Appeals has nothing to do with a case until it has
gone through the usual procedure in the Income Tax Unit and the Commissioner has made a final determination of the taxpayer's liability for
additional taxes and notified him to that effect. The Board is not a
substitute for the Income Tax Unit but an appeal body to review determinations made by it and presupposes a comprehensive consideration
of the case there, so that only substantial questions will reach the Board.
As a matter of pride in its work the Income Tax Unit will eventually
so handle its cases, but this goal has not yet been reached, partly because of the long delay in making field audits for the heavy tax years
together with the difficulty of making thorough investigations and having full hearings before the running of the Statute of Limitations. If
the taxpayer is unwilling to waive the running of the Statute, and frequently in other cases, the Commissioner has summarily made a final
determination and notified the taxpayer. There has been so many such
cases that the General Counsel for the Bureau of Internal Revenue has
organized a special department for the adjustment of cases appealed
to the Board.
The jurisdiction of the Board of Tax Appeals is to pass upon appeals from the Commissioner's final determination of a deficiency in
tax, either of income, excess profits, estate or gift taxes. 3 This does
not include any preliminary determination or correspondence with the
taxpayer such as the so-called "thirty day letter," which gives the taxpayer the right to file a protest or have a hearing. 4 Jeopardy assess'Sec. 273, 283, 308, 318 Rev.
i Board of Tax Appeals 75.

Act of 1926. See Appeal of Joseph Garneau Co.,

"Appeal of Fidelity Insurance Agency, i Board Tax Appeals 86.
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ments give rise to a peculiar problem which is discussed later. Under
the 1924 Act the Board lost all jurisdiction of a case once the deficiency
determination by the Commissioner had been paid. This was true even
though the payment was made while the appeal was pending before the
Board and was done to save the running of interest on a jeopardy assessment. 5
Likewise, the Board had no jurisdiction over the Commissioner's
determination on claims for refund." While under the 1926 Act the
Board still has no jurisdiction of claims for refund as such or of cases
where the tax has been paid prior to appeal, there is now the important
provision that payment of the deficiency during appeal to the Board will
not deprive it of jurisdiction. The Board can still proceed with the case
and refund will be made if it determines that there is no deficiency.
This makes it possible in jeopardy assessment cases to save the accumulation of interest on the deficiency.' In the ordinary case of a
deficiency determination, the making of any assessment or the commencement of any proceeding to collect the tax may be enjoined during the pendency of the case before the Board.8
The Commissioner's right to make a jeopardy assessment gave rise
to peculiar problems which were not met by the 1924 Revenue Act
but have been remedied in the 1926 Act. Under the 1924 Act as well as
earlier acts the Commissioner had the right at any time while considering a case to make a determination that the government's rights would
be jeopardized by delay and could force payment by the taxpayer of
the amount fixed in the jeopardy assessment as due from him. The
taxpayer could then file a claim for refund and, if the Commissioner's
determination thereon were adverse, sue in court to recover the amount
so paid., This forced the taxpayer to pay an assessment, often a heavy
one, without having a hearing even in the Income Tax Unit. There
could be no appeal to the court from such jeopardy assessment without
first paying the amount of it, as under Revised Statutes Section 3224 the
collection of the tax could not be enjoined.
Under the 1924 act the
Commissioner thus had power to deprive the Board of Tax Appeals of
its jurisdiction by merely making a jeopardy assessment and enforcing
collection of it prior to the trial of the case before the Board. If the
taxpayer could not delay the evil day of payment until the Board of Tax
Appeals had decided his case, the Board would then have no jurisdiction
because there was no unpaid deficiency then claimed by the Commis'Appeal of Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., I B. T. A. 767.
'Appeal of Everett Knitting Works, i B. T. A. 5.
'Sec. 279 (i) Act of 1926.
'Sec. 274(a) Act of 1926.
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sionerY It was obviously an anomalous situation for one who was a
litigant before a judicial tribunal to be able to deprive it of all jurisdiction to pass upon the case,
In many cases of jeopardy assessments it was left to the local Collector of Internal Revenue either to collect the tax or have satisfactory
security for the payment of it if the Board's decision should be against
the taxpayer. He, however, was held responsible for the collection of
the tax and of necessity had to insist upon the best of security if he
should not proceed by distraint. The Collector of Internal Revenue for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin has exercised this discretion very
fairly, but the fact remains that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
could deprive the Board of jurisdiction.
Efforts have been made to enjoin the Commissioner from proceeding
with the collection of such jeopardy assessment during the pendency
of an appeal to the Board on the theory that R.S. 3224 was obviously
not intended to apply to that situation. One Federal District Court
granted such an injunction and another denied it. 1" Before the final
determination of those cases on appeal the Revenue Act of 1926 was
adopted and covered the situation.
Under the present act the Commissioner may still make a jeopardy
assessment even after the taxpayer has appealed to the Board, but the
taxpayer may file a bond with the Board and avoid payment of the tax
until the amount of the deficiency is ultimately determined. Moreover,
he can even pay the tax if he prefers to do so to avoid the running of
interest and still have his case heard before the Board and secure a
refund if its decision is favorable to him.
What constitutes a determination of a deficiency of tax from which
the taxpayer may appeal to the Board is often a close question. It is
defined by the statute to be the amount by which the correct tax exceeds
the tax shown on the taxpayer's return." This has been construed by
the Board to mean the original return rather than any amended return.
In one case a personal service corporation which was not subject to a
tax was compelled to make a return under the regulations then in force
and computed.the tax for the period in question. However, annexed
to the return was a protest !tating that it was a personal service corporation and that no tax was due from it. The Commissioner denied this
contention and held that the amount shown on the return was due as a
'Appeal of Everett Knitting Co., supra; Appeal of Northwestern Mutual Life
Ins. Co., supra.
"Lafayette Worsted Co. v. Page (District Court Rhode Island), 6 Fed. (2nd)
399; Joseph Garneau Co. v. Bdwers- (District Court, S. D. New York), 8 Fed.
(2nd) 378." Sec 273(1) Act of 1926.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

tax. The Board held that this was a determination of a deficiency from
which the taxpayer could appeal. 12 In another case after the filing of
the original, return showing a tax liability an amended return was filed
showing a smaller amount of tax. The Commissioner determined that
the original return showed the correct tax. The Board held that the
Commissioner had not determined a deficiency within the statutory
meaning of the term and that it had no jurisdiction." It has also held
that a tentative return is not the return contemplated by the statute.
The controlling question is whether the Commissioner determines that
there is an additional amount due over that admitted by the taxpayer
on his original return to be the correct tax.
Under jeopardy assessments considerable difficulty has arisen in determining when a final determination was made by the Commissioner, as
such determination was not announced to the taxpayer in the same form
as the ordinary determination of a deficiency, and hence there was no
formal sixty day letter notifying the taxpayer of a deficiency determination. Theoretically, the deficiency was determined when the jeopardy
assessment was made, and therefore no additional notification of a
deficiency is given. The jeopardy assessment, however, anticipated further consideration of the actual tax liability through action by the Income Tax Unit upon the claim for abatement of the jeopardy assessment. Under the 1924 Act it was the final determination on this claim
for abatement from which an appeal could be taken, and it was a question of fact as to what constituted this final determination. Any notification to the taxpayer that his claim for abatement was denied and
showing that no further consideration of the matter would be given
constituted a final determination. The Board has held that the fact
that "such determination is not expressed in an adopted form is immaterial provided it determines the case on the merits and disposes of
the contentions of the taxpayer."' 14 Claims for abatement are abolished
under the 1926 Act and the Commissioner is now required to mail a
sixty day letter within sixty days after making the jeopardy- assessment.
This protects the taxpayer by giving him a definite notice of a final
determination together with notice of his right to appeal." He may
also file a bond to stay collection of the jeopardy assessment during the
pendency of the appeal.'

6

'Appeal of Continental Accounting & Auditing Co., 2 B. T.A. 761.
"Appeal of New York Trust Co., Executors of Estate of John Ballot, 3 B.
T. A. 583.
"Appeal of Ormsby McKnight Mitchell, i B. T. A. i43.
'Sec. 279(b) Act of 1926.
"Sec. 279(f) Act of 1926.
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The 1926 Act further eliminates the Commissioner's powers in making a determination and assessment of deficiency. Previously he could
issue a new sixty day letter even after the taxpayer had appealed to
the Board from a previous one and only the operation of the Statutes
of Limitation would enable the taxpayer to know that his tax liability
was finally determined. Now the Commissioner can issue only one
such final letter, and the taxpayer knows that the determination of the
Board of Tax Appeals will be final unless appealed from.17
The deficiency determination from which an appeal may be taken
must have been made after June 2, 1924, the date of the enactment of
the Revenue Act of 1924 creating the Board.1 8 Frequently a taxpayer
would appeal to 'the Commissioner after June 2, 1924 for a rehearing
or correspond about details of the determination announced prior thereto. Letters replying to such communications and reiterating the Commissioner's position were not determinations of deficiency from which
appeals could be taken. If, however, the Commissioner should reopen
the case for further consideration, his letter announcing his decision
is a final determination, if he makes any changes in the figures or otherwise modifies the basis of his action.
Upon the Commissioner of Internal Revenue making his final determination that there is due from the taxpayer an additional amount over
that shown on his original income tax return, the final letter, commonly
referred to as the "Sixty day letter," is mailed to the taxpayer notifying him of the amount determined as a deficiency and also advising him
that within sixty days from the date of mailing of such letter he may
appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals. 19 While it is not compulsory
upon the Commissioner to notify the taxpayer of his right to appeal, it
is a commendable practice and makes possible the saving of the rights
of many taxpayers who might let the sixty day period go by before
learning of the right to appeal to the Board.
The petition to the Board of Tax Appeals must be filed in the office
of the Secretary within sixty days from the date of the mailing of the
Commissioner's letter notifying the taxpayer of the final determination.
The date on the letter is controlling unless there is proof of a different
date of actual mailing. The sixty day period is prescribed by the
20
statute and there can be no extension of time.
This petition instituting a proceeding is a combination of both trial
court and appellate procedure. It must first set out allegations showing
2'Sec. 274(f) and 3o8(f) Act of 1926.
"8 Appeal of Joseph Garneau Co., I B. T. A. 75, Livingston Worsted Co., I B.
T. A. 991.
"Sec. 274(a) Act of 1926.
"Appeal of United Telephone Co., i B. T. A. 450.
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jurisdiction in the Board, namely, a determination by the Commissioner
of a deficiency in tax and the date of mailing of the letter. A copy of
the Commissioner's final letter is required to be attached to the petition
so that the nature of this letter and its date will appear from the petition. The petitioner must then set out his assignments of error alleged
to have been made by the Commissioner in the determination of a
deficiency,-much as an appellant seeking review of a trial court's
decision would allege that error was committed by the trial court. The
petitidner must then set out the facts upon which he relies to establish
his case. The petition must be verified and signed by either the peti2 1

tioner or his counsel.

Upon the petition being filed the Board serves a copy upon the
General Counsel representing the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
who files his answer and the case is then set down for hearing. The
Board holds most of these hearings in Washington, but from time to
time hearings are also held at various points throughout the country for
the accommodation of taxpayers. The Chairman of the Board has
stated that approximately eighty-five per cent of the taxpayers elect to
have their cases heard in Washington. The cases are heard by a division of the Board usually consisting of three members. Because of the
large number of cases now pending there has been considerable discussion of hearings by individual members so that more cases may be
disposed of.
The burden of proof in hearings is on the taxpayer to establish the
allegations of his petition.2 2 The determination of a deficiency made by
the Commissioner is presumed to be correct and the taxpayer has the
unique problem of first proving a negative, that is that the Commissioner erred, and then proving positively the correct tax liability.
Merely showing that the Commissioner erred is, of course, of no advantage to the taxpayer as the Board must have before it competent
evidence from which it can determine the true tax liability.
Because of the assignments of error set outdn the petition many
practitioners have assumed that the hearing before the Board is an appellate review of the Commissioner's determination and that all affidavits, accounting records and other statements presented in the hearing before the Commissioner automatically are part of the record and
evidence before the Board. The hearing before the Board, however,
is an entirely de novo proceeding conducted before the Board as a court.
Practitioners accustomed to the informal procedure in hearings in the
Income Tax Unit have had considerable difficulty in accustoming them'See Rule 5 of Board.
' Rule 30 of Board; Appeal of J. M. Lyon, i B. T. A. 378.
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selves to the procedure before the Board, and particularly in appreciating that the strict rules of legal evidence must be applied by the Board.
The previous history of the case, the hearings before the Commissioner,
affidavits, statements and other papers placed in evidence there do not
come before the Board unless proved and established*by legal evidence
and the Board is not interested in the earlier -proceeding except insofar
as it may be needed to show how the Commissioner computed the
deficiency.2 3 It is difficult for one not accustomed to applying the strict
rules of legal evidence to appreciate that balance sheets are not evidence
of the facts therein contained unless the basic facts reflected in them
are established by competent evidence, as it is also difficult for him to
appreciate why a sworn statement or petition constitutes evidence in the
Commissioner's office and the sworn petition to the Board of Tax Appeals is no evidence to the Board whatever of the truth of the allegations in it. Many cases have been dismissed because the taxpayer or his
representative has appeared at the hearing with no evidence whatever
other than the petition or'some financial statement, or because such statement or other evidence could not be used for the reason that a proper
foundation for it was not laid. It is extremely important that the taxpayer be prepared to prove every essential fact by competent legal
evidence so that his claims may be properly proved.
Under the 1924 Act the Board was left free to determine its own
rules of evidence and applied the general common law rules. The
1926 Act definitely requires the procedure to be in accordance with the
rules of evidence applicable in Courts of Equity in the District of
Columbia. 2- This not only eliminates some possibility of uncertainty
as to rules of evidence because of different decisions in different states
but also thereby fixes the status of the Board as a tax court.
The taxpayer has the. advantage of being able in most cases to produce evidence in support of his contention, whereas the Commissioner
has great difficulty in doing so. Where the question is largely one of
fact as, for example, whether a salary deduction made by a corporation is a proper one, the taxpayer can make out a prima facie case by the
testimony of some officer of the corporation that the salary was paid
for actual services rendered and was a reasonable amount for such
services. The Commissioner usually has no direct evidence whatever
on such a question and must rely upon cross-examination of the petitioner's witnesses to bring out facts or contradictory statements by the
witness destroying the effect of his main testimony. The Commissioner
generally has various statements or reports -made by the taxpayer from
Appeal of J. M. Lyon, supra.

'Sec. 907(a) Act of 1926.
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time to time during the preliminary investigation of the case and may
be able to use these in cross-examination when he would be unable to
get them in -evidence if required to prove them independently.
The difficulty on the part of the Commissioner in producing direct
evidence is the main reason for placing the burden of proof upon the
taxpayer. The argument is that it is presumed that the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and the Commissioner's office have given the case a
thorough and comprehensive investigation and hearing before making a
final determination. The answer is that one of the factors resulting in
the establishment of the Board of Tax Appeals was the very difficulty
of securing such a hearing in the Bureau of Internal Revenue where
one man represented both the government and the taxpayer in passing
on the case.
In fact, there is a sound basis for placing the burden of proof on the
commissioner. The taxpayer is required to make a sworn statement of
his income, and there are penalties for failing to make a return or for
a false return. If the Commissioner takes the position that additional
taxes are due, he should be required to prove it. As it is, he can point
the finger of suspicion at a taxpayer and require him to disprove
charges, the exact nature of which he may not even know, as in fraud
cases where penalties are claimed. American notions of fair play require one making such charges to state them clearly and then to prove
them.
After both the petitioner and the Commissioner have presented their
evidence, made their arguments and filed their brief, the case is taken
under advisement by the three members of the division who heard the
case. They then make their decision and write the opinion. The law
provides that the decision of the division hearing the case shall be final
unless within thirty days the chairman directs its review by the Board.
While such review has been customary in all cases to insure uniformity
of decisions, it cannot continue if the Board is to' clear up the great
accumulation of cases.
The effect of the Board's decision is entirely different under the 1926
Act than it was under the 1924 Act. The 1924 Act did not make the
Board's determination binding upon either party other than to make its
findings prima facie evidence in court proceedings of the facts so found.
The Commissioner could sue in court to recover additional taxes if he
was not satisfied with the Board's decision and the taxpayer could file
a claim for refund after being compelled to pay the tax and still sue
in court to recover the amount paid.2 5 While under the 1926 Act both
parties still have the option of suing in court after the determination by
Sec. goo(g) Act of

1924.
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the Board on cases pending at the time of the adoption of the 1926 Act,
in all new cases the determination of the Board is final and binding
upon both the taxpayer and the Commissioner, save for the right to
appeal to an appellate court.2 Either the Commissioner of the taxpayer
may appeal.2 7 The taxpayer may still elect to pay the tax in the first
instance, file a claim for refund and then sue in court to'recover it.
But, if he appeals to the Board, that is his only remedy and the decision
of the Board or appellate court on review of the Board's decision is
final for both the taxpayer and the Commissioner.
Such an appeal for review of the Board's decision must be taken by
petition for that-purpose within six months after the date of the Board's
decision. This appeal may be taken either to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District in which the taxpayer is an inhabitant or the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia. A corporation may take its
appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the district in which is located
the office of the Collector to whom the return was made. While the
statute does not expressly so state, such right of review necessarily includes the right to pass upon the admission or exclusion of evidence
before the Board, and includes the right to remand the case for a hearing and determination upon proper evidence. The determination of the
2
appellate court is subject to review by certiorari by the Supreme Court. 1
The 1926 Revenue Act has for all practical purposes made the Board
of Tax Appeals a tax court and the taxpayer now has the opportunity
to secure a court determination of his liability before being compelled
to pay the tax. The practical question is whether the Board will be able
to handle the great burden placed upon it. More than I9,OOO petitions
have been filed in a little over two years since the Board's existence.
Some 3,000 cases have been disposed of by dismissal, decisions have
been rendered in about 1,6oo cases and there is said to be about 850 cases
in which hearing have been had but no decisions rendered. This leaves
around 13,000 cases which have accumulated in the two years of the
Board's existence. Taxpayers now wait many months for hearings
after petitions are filed with the Board. Unless the handling of cases
can be" expedited, the Board cannot function satisfactorily.
No criticism has been made of the personnel of the Board, as all reports ate that they have worked diligently for long hours. Obviously
an easy remedy is tb reduce the number of appeals or speed up the disposition of cases, but it is another thing entirely to tell how this can be
done.
Sec. 274(b) Act of 1926.
-'Sec. iooi (a) Act of 1926.
'Sec. iooiff Act of 1926.
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The Board will probably have hearings before divisions of a single
member which will greatly increase the number of cases heard. With
review by the Board of decisions in cases involving fundamental principles rather than questions of fact uniformity of decisions can still be
had.
Many appeals have been taken where the amount involved is so small
that obviously the taxpayer has no intention of trying the case. Many
involve little more than the Ten Dollar filing fee now required, and
which was hoped to be a deterrent to such cases. Such small cases will
,usually be disposed of without hearing because the taxpayer does not
appear.
Likewise many cases are appealed to the Board merely to postpone
the evil day of payment. The Board now has the power when it appears
that proceedings before it have been instituted by the taxpayer merely
for delay to award damages to the .Government in an amount not in
excess of $500.oo.

A few such awards may reduce frivolous appeals.

The Commissioner's office itself can do the most to reduce the number
of appeals. The granting of power to the Board to award damages to
taxpayers who are forced to appeal to the Board because of arbitrary or
unreasonable action by representatives of the Commissioner would have
a salutary effect in preventing final determinations which cannot reasonably be expected to stand up on review by the Board. Likewise if the
burden of proof before the Board were placed upon the Commissioner,
so-called final determinations of deficiencies would not be made for
which there is no sound basis or no supporting proof.
The Board of Tax Appeals establishes in federal tax practice the
sound principle of the taxpayer's right to a day in court before being
compelled to pay a claim for additional taxes. The great volume of
work thrown upon the Board shows the eagerness of taxpayers to avail
themselves of this opportunity. This has created great difficulties in the
work of the Board, but these problems will be met, as taxpayers will
insist upon the continuance of the Board or some similar body for the
determination of tax disputes.

